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WHERE WILL THEY Go?
SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY
RESTRICTIONS AS MODERN-DAY
BANISHMENT
Following the occurrence of several high-profile child abductions
and murders in the 1980s and 1990s, parents in the United States
intensely feared for the safety of their children. In an effort to
appease these voters by appearing tough on crime, state and national
legislators began to create strict requirements for ex-felons released
from prison after being convicted of a sexual offense. First came
registration laws so that police were aware of the location of these
offenders. Next were online registries providing members of the
public with details on where offenders were living and the particulars
of their crimes. These were quickly followed by restrictions on where
the sex offenders could reside.
Over twenty states have enacted sex offender residency restrictions
since their inception in 1995. While the restrictions vary in terms of
protected zones and an offender's required distance from those
locations, most of the statutes prohibit sex offenders from living
within a minimum of five hundred feet of a school or daycare facility.
Various courts have upheld the constitutionality of these constraints.
Yet, as these laws become increasingly prevalent, more and more
jurisdictions on both the state and municipal levels are adopting
them-and in stricter forms-in order to avoid becoming dumping
grounds for the sex offenders of neighboring jurisdictions. The result
is that some of the statutes, by their massive scope, ban offenders
from living in entire cities.
As these laws become more widespread, the concern is that,
eventually, these convicted criminals might have nowhere left to live.
In that sense, though not analogous to the formal definition of
the word, these sex offender residency restrictions appear to be a
modem-day version of banishment-a form of punishment deemed
unconstitutional in many jurisdictions. But can these laws truly be
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called banishment? If so, what is the solution to the problem? These
are questions this Note seeks to answer.
1. RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS

A. Background
Sex offender residency restriction laws as they exist today are a
response to a series of tragic events that occurred during the 1980s
and early 1990s. The abduction and murder of Adam Walsh in 1981,
the subsequent abduction and disappearance of Jacob Wetterling in
1989, and the abductions and murders of Polly Klaas in 1993 and
Megan Kanka in 1994 led to a flood of media attention on the issue of
protecting American children.' It was Megan Kanka' s murder,
however, that directed the focus on sex offenders. Out of all the
events mentioned, hers was the only murder committed by a
convicted sex offender who lived in her neighborhood.2
In the late 1980s, various states began to create sex offender
registries in order to keep tabs on individuals convicted of various sex
crimes.3 In 1990, Washington became the first state to supplement its
registry by going one step fuirther, creating a community notification
law that required law enforcement to notify residents when a
convicted sex offender moved into their neighborhood.4 Florida and
Alabama soon followed suit, passing their own laws in 1996 and
1999, respectively.5 Following Megan Kanka's murder, Congress
stepped in to create federal law on the matter, passing the Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act in 1994, which requires states to create registries of
convicted sex offenders.6 In addition, Congress passed Megan's Law

I David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Statutes and the Culture of Fear: The Case
for More Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven Public Safety Laws, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 600, 604-06 (2006).
2 Id. at 605.
3Corey Raybumn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101, 121 (2007).
4Id.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (authorizing the
release of information about convicted sex offenders and kidnapping offenders through a public
web site). See generally Recent Legislation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 787, 787 (1995) (explaining
that Washington's 1990 law serves as a model for other sex offender notification initiatives by
lawmakers and communities).
5Steven J. Wemnick, Note, In Accordance With a Public Outcry: Zoning Out Sex
Offenders Through Residence Restrictions in Florida, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1147, 1157 (2006); see
also ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405 (West
2001 & Supp. 2008).
6 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1407 1(a) (2000 & Supp. 2005)); Singleton, supra note 1, at 605.
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in 1996, requiring all states to implement some type of community
notification in neighborhoods where sex offenders reside.7
In the meantime, states began a race to protect America' s
children, leading to the appearance of the first sex offender
residency restriction statutes in Florida, Delaware, and Michigan
in 1995.8 The typical residency restriction statute prohibits any sex
offender from residing within a certain distance (usually
somewhere between 1,000 and 2,500 feet) of places that are
determined to be areas where children congregate. 9 Such areas
typically include schools,' daycare centers, bus stops, and
playgrounds.' 0 While a few states have adopted residency
restrictions that apply only to sex offenders whose victims were
minors, and others use a parole board's risk assessment to
determine to whom the restrictions should apply,"1 most states'
restrictions apply to all sex offenders-a broad category that can
encompass everything from public urination and consensual sex
among teenagers to aggravated rape and child molestation. 12
B. Residency Restrictions Today
Today, more than twenty states have passed some type of sex
offender residency restriction.' 3 Iowa enacted the strictest restriction
that existed at the time in 2002, prohibiting sex offenders whose
victims were minors from living within 2,000 feet of a school or
registered childcare facility.'14 Although the law was designed to
protect the welfare of children in the state and prevent sex offenders
from recidivating,' 5 the statute had consequences that few realized at
7Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345, 1345 (1996) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2005)); Singleton, supra note 1, at 606.
8 Singleton, supra note 1, at 607; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 11I12(a) (200 1)
(enacted 1995) (prohibiting sex offenders from living within 500 feet of any school); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 947.1405(7) (enacted 1995) (prohibiting sex offenders whose victims were under age
eighteen from living within 1,000 feet of a school, park, playground, public school bus stop, or
other place where children regularly congregate); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.735(1),
28.733(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) (enacted 1995) (prohibiting sex offenders from living
within 1,000 feet of any "school safety zone").

9 MARCUS NIETo & DAVID JUNG, CAL. STATE LIBRARY, THE IMPACT OF RESIDENCY
RESTRICTIONS ON SEX OFFENDERS AND CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: A
LITERATURE REVIEW 15 (2006), availableat http://www library ca.gov/crb/06/08/06-008.pdf.

Id

10

1See

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US

app. at 139-141 (2007), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2007/us0907/us0907web.pdf (listing
and describing sex offender residency restrictions by state).
12 Idat39-40.
13 Id. at 100.
14 Yung, supranote 3, at 124; see also IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 692A.2A

(West 2003 & Supp.

2008).
i5

Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 720 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The Iowa statute [wa]s designed to
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the time. The constitutionality of the law was quickly challenged
because the result of the 2,000-foot restriction, as found by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, was to
completely ban sex offenders from living in many of Iowa's small
towns and cities. 16 The court went on to explain,
[M]aps show that the two thousand foot circles cover
virtually the entire city area. The few areas in Des Moines,
for instance, which are not restricted, include only industrial
areas or some of the city's newest and most expensive
neighborhoods. In smaller towns that have a school or child
care facility, the entire town is often engulfed by an excluded
area. In Johnson County alone, the towns of Lone Tree, North
Liberty, Oxford, Shueyville, Solon, Swisher, and Tiffen are
wholly restricted to sex offenders under § 692A.2A.
Unincorporated areas and towns too small to have a school or
child care facility remain available, as does the country, but
available housing in these areas is not necessarily readily
available."7
The court added that, although entirely unrestricted areas do exist
within the state, these areas are exclusively limited to very small
towns without any schools, or to farmland.'18 On the basis of these
findings, the court struck down the Iowa restriction, declaring it
unconstitutional as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause as it was
applied to those who committed their crimes prior to the law's
enactment.' 9 The court also found the restriction unconstitutional,
because it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive and
procedural due process rights for offenders .20 Despite the district
court's extensive findings in the case, the ruling was later overturned
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit .2 ' The
Eighth Circuit focused on distinguishing the restriction from the old
reduce the likelihood of reoffense by limiting the offender's temptation and reducing the
opportunity to commit a new crime").
6 Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 869 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (finding that although the
Iowa law did not "banish" sex offenders from towns on its face, it did so in practical
application), rev d, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
17 Id at 851 (internal citations omitted).
is Id. at 869.
19 Id at 880.
20

Id

Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 723 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the Iowa legislature's
decisions regarding restrictions on sex offenders were "reasonably related" to its regulatory
purpose and that it was not successfuilly demonstrated that the restrictions amounted to
retroactive punishment).
21
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common law punishment of banishment 22 and, in doing so, found the
restriction to be non-punitive and therefore a constitutional regulatory
23
law.
Other states have since followed Iowa's example, enacting even
stricter laws. California citizens passed Proposition 83 in 2006, which
prohibits all registered sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of
any school or park.2 Georgia also passed its residency restriction in
2006, prohibiting all registered sex offenders from living within 1,000
feet of a school, childcare facility, church, school bus stop, or other
place where minors congregate .25 These restrictions have far-reaching
effects, making it impossible for some offenders to find a place to
live. One convict in Augusta, Georgia, was left with only two
possible places to live once the restriction went into effect-both
were hotels.2 The only job he could find upon release was at a fast
food restaurant; he could not afford a hotel bill for long and was
ultimately left homeless.2 His problems did not stop there; one
lawyer found that there is only one homeless shelter in the entire state
of Georgia willing to accept sex offenders.2 Unfortunately, Georgia
has also made it a policy to arrest any offenders who are homeless,
arguing that these individuals are violating their responsibility to
register under the state and federal laws since ...
you have to have an
address."',2 9 The statute is written so that a second violation of the
registration laws means an automatic lifetime prison sentence for the
violator.3
These restrictions, when applied, severely limit an offender's
ability to find housing upon release from prison because communities
that have enacted such statutes, particularly communities with larger
safety zones, have effectively blocked offenders from living in most
urban areas .3 ' A good example of the real-world effects of these
restrictions can be seen on the following maps of the City of
Minneapolis. As one can see, even a 1,500-foot safety zone around
schools and parks leaves an offender with very little housing options
22
23
24

A32.-

Idat 719-20.
Id. at 723.

Jenifer Warren, Judge Blocks

25 GA. CODE ANN.
26

§ 42-1-15

Part of Sex Offender Low, L.A. TIMES,

Nov. 8, 2006, at

(1997 & Supp. 2007).

Shaila Dewan, Homelessness Could Mean Life in Prisonfor Offender, N.Y. TIMES,

Aug. 3, 2007,

atAI13.

27 Id
28 Id

29 Id. (quoting Sgt. Ray Hardin of the Richmond County Sheriffs Office in Atlanta).
30 Id

31 Joseph L. Lester, Off to Elba! The Legitimacy of Sex Offender Residence and
Employment Restrictions, 40 AKRON L. REv. 339, 352 (2007).
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within the city. With minor exceptions, all of the areas left available
are non-residential areas of the city, meaning there would be little to
no housing options for offenders in those areas. 32 This becomes a
greater issue when you consider that landlords-even those in the
33
unrestricted areas-have begun to evict discovered sex offenders.
As a result of these stark effects, the Minnesota Department of
Corrections recommended that the state not adopt a statewide
residency restriction,~ and the state followed that recommendation.
The end result of these expansive residency restrictions is that
offenders will either live in a rural area of the state, leave the state
entirely, or face the reality that they may be sent back to jail for
violations of the strict registration or residency restriction statutes.
In addition to these broad residency restrictions, Georgia 35 and
39
38
other states, such as Alabama' 36 Idaho' 37 Illinois, Louisiana,
41
40
have restrictions barring sex
and South Dakota'
Michigan'

offenders from loitering within a certain distance of places where
children typically gather. Some states also have restrictions barring
offenders from working within certain distances of schools or daycare

32 See MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT
ISSUES 10 (2003, rev. 2004), available at http://www.corr.state.mn.us/publications/
legislativereports/pdf/2004ILvl 3 SEX OFFENDERS report 2003 (revised 2-04).pdf.
33 Ryan Hawkins, Note, Human Zoning: The Constitutionality of Sex-Offender Residency
Restrictions as Applied to Post-Conviction Offenders, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 331, 339 (2007)
(pointing out that three of the plaintiffs in Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005), had
rental applications rejected or were evicted once the landlords discovered their criminal
records).
34 MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 32, at 11.
35 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (1997 & Supp. 2007) (prohibiting sex offenders from
residing or loitering within 1,000 feet of a school, child care facility, church, school bus stop, or
other place where minors congregate).
36 ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(o (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (prohibiting sex offenders from
loitering within 500 feet of "a school, child care facility, playground, park, athletic field or
facility, or any other business or facility having a principal purpose of caring for, educating, or
entertaining minors" and defining "loiter" under this subdivision as to be in a place without
having any legitimate purpose or to remain in a place for longer than your legitimate purpose
requires).
37 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329 (Supp. 2008) (prohibiting registered sex offenders from
residing or loitering within 500 feet of a school with students under eighteen years of age).
38 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.3(b), (b-5) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (prohibiting
child sex offenders from residing or loitering within 500 feet of a school).
39 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1 (2004 & Supp. 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:538
(2005 & Supp. 2008) (prohibiting sex offenders whose offense involved a minor from stepping
foot within 1,000 feet of a school, daycare facility, playground, public or private youth center,
public swimming pool, or free standing video arcade facility).
40 MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 28.733, 28.734, 28.735 (Supp. 2008) (applying a penalty to sex
offenders residing or loitering within 1,000 feet of school property).
41 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-24B3-22, 22-2413-24, 22-2413-27, 22-2413-28 (2006)
(prohibiting sex offenders from residing or loitering within 500 feet of a school, public park,
playground, or public pool).
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facilities. 2 These statutes, coupled with the residency restrictions,
leave most offeqnders with little or no reason to travel into a state's
urban cities. But even those offenders with reason to travel into these
areas are likely to avoid them since a lack of notice is not a defense to
violations of the laws.4

42 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (1997 & Sup 2007) (prohibiting sex offenders
from working within 1,000 feet of a school, child care facility, church, school bus stop, or other
place where minors congregate); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.733, 28.734, 28.735 (Supp. 2008)
(applying a penalty to sex offenders working within a student safety zone).
43 See Yung, supra note 3, at 142-43 (noting the difficulties that sex offenders encounter
when living in urban areas).

168 SE WESTERN
~CA RESER VE LA W RE VIEW

168

1,500' Park Zone

1,500' School Zone
Minneapalis December 2002

44

44

MiNN. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 32, at 20 app. C-2.
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Municipalities have started to enact residency restrictions of their
own-particularly cities in states that have not yet adopted a
statewide residency restriction. New Jersey remains without a
statewide residency restriction, but over 110 towns have passed
residency restrictions' 4 6 most of which impose a 2,500-foot safety
zone around "schools, parks, playgrounds, and day-care cetrs'A7
Jersey City's restriction prohibits any registered sex offender over the
age of eighteen from living within 2,500 feet of any school, daycare
center, day camp, city, county or state park, playground, commercial
recreation facility (such as theaters, bowling alleys, sports fields, or
48
exercise or sport facilities), convenience store,' or public library.
Even if proximity to a school is the lone consideration, the only areas
of the city that remain available are railroad tracks, a cemetery, and a
mall with only a small amount of housing. Once the remainder of the
restrictions are accounted for, even those minimal options disappear.4
Communities in states that already enforce residency restrictions,
such as Florida, have also passed their own ordinances on the matter,
enforcing safety zones larger than those provided for by state law. 50 A
Miami Beach ordinance requires that sex offenders whose victims
were under the age of sixteen live at least 2,500 feet away from any
school .5 1 This ordinance created a housing shortage for sex offenders
that has left at least five such offenders seeking shelter under the Julia
Tuttle Causeway.5 And they are not alone. According to the Florida
Department of Corrections, such laws have left many sex offenders
homeless throughout the state.5
These state and local sex offender residency restrictions have
proliferated across the country since they were first introduced. When
the Iowa restriction was passed, neighboring states began to propose
similar restrictions in an effort to avoid becoming dumping grounds
for Iowa sex offenders who might leave the state in search of more
readily available housing and jobs.54 Indeed, states that would like to
Yung, supra note 3, at 126.
R. Petracca, Note, Banished! - New Jersey's Municipalities' Unconstitutional
Trend of Banishing Sex Offenders, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 253, 259 (2006).
48 Elizabeth Weill-Greenberg, Sex Offenders? Not in My Backyard!, CITY BELT (Hudson
County, N.J.), Jan. 23, 2007, http://citybelt.typepad.com/citybelt/2007/01/sex-offenders-n.htm.
49 Id.
50 See Wernick, supra note 5, at 1163-.64; Yung, supra note 3, at 125-26.
51 Wemnick, supra note 5, at 1164.
52 The Julia Tuttle Causeway is a portion of the interstate connecting Miami to Miami
Beach. John Zarrlla & Patrick Oppmann, FloridaHousing Sex Offenders Under Bridge, CNN,
Apr. 6, 2007, http://www cnn com/I2007/LAW/04/05lbridge.sex.offenders/index.htm.
53 Id.
54 Peter D. Edgerton, Comment, Banishment and the Right to Live Where You Want, 74 U.
CHi. L. REv. 1023, 1054 (2007) (citing Monica Davey, Iowa's Residency Rules Drive Sex
46

47' Matthew
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avoid becoming a safe haven for sex offenders are left with little
choice but to implement residency restrictions of their own-the
stricter, the better-to avoid an influx of convicts into their
jurisdictions.5 In addition, Congress has been passing laws to
nationalize the treatment of sex offenders. Congress required all states
to register their sex offenders in 1994 and required states to
implement community notification laws in 1996.5 Most recently, in
2006, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Act, which creates a national
sex offender registry, makes failure to register a federal crime,
expands the amount of information that offenders must provide when
they register, increases the categories of offenders required to register,
and lengthens the period during which they are required to remain
registered. 57 Congress made the receipt of certain federal funds
conditional on a state implementing the regulations outlined by the
Act, further compelling states to implement the newer, stricter
registration requirements . 58 If this trend continues, it will only be a
matter of time before Congress passes a national residency restriction
statute, especially considering the constant desire of politicians to
appear tough on crime.

11. BANISHMENT
A. History
While the use of banishment as punishment dates back as far as

2285 B.C., 59 banishment became connected with America when
England began sending convicts abroad to both America and
Australia in the eighteenth century.6 0 Ireland and Scotland also
participated in this form of banishment, termed "transportation." 6

Offenders Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006, at AlI).
55 Yung, supra note 3, at 148-49.
56 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
57 See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120

Stat. 587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,

supra note 11, at 37-38; OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL
GUIDELINES FOR SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION: PROPOSED GUIDELINES 45 (2007), available at http://www.oip.gov/smart/pdfs/Sroposed somaguidelines.odf.
58 See OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., supra note 57, at 6 (pointing out that Section 125 of the
Act stipulates a mandatory 10 percent reduction in federal justice assistance funding for states
that refuse to or cannot implement the law to a substantial degree).
59 Win. Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposalfor Its A bolition
Under the First Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 459 (1998)
(citing THE OLDEST CODE OF LAWS IN THE WORLD: THE CODE OF LAWS PROMULGATED BY
HAMMURABI, KING OF BABYLON, B.C. 2285-2242 at 31 (C.H.W Johns Trans., 1911)).
60 See id at461-62.
61 Idat 462.
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Though this mode of punishment was outlawed in England in the
mid-nineteenth century,62 its use continued in the United States.
Beginning with colonial America, the government banished persons
who violated laws or otherwise behaved in an inappropriate manner.6 3
B. Banishment Today
Despite its prior use in the United States, many states now
explicitly forbid the use of banishment. At least fifteen states
currently outlaw the use of banishment in their constitutions.6 In
addition to those that explicitly outlaw the practice, most state and
federal courts have found banishment illegal.6 5 However, at least five
states permit the use of banishment, to varying degrees. 6 6 Georgia has
upheld 158 of 159 county banishments-which banish offenders from
Id. at 462-63.
Matthew D. Borrelli, Note, Banishment: The Constitutional and Public Policy
Arguments Against This Revived Ancient Punishment,36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 469, 471 (2003).
64 Snider, supra note 59, at 465; see, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 30 ("[N]o citizen shall be
exiled."); ARK. CONST. art. II, § 21 ("[N]or shall any person, under any circumstances, be exiled
from the State."); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 21 ("Neither banishment beyond the limits of the
state nor whipping shall be allowed as a punishment for crime."); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No
person shall be transported out of the State for an offense committed within the State."); KAN.
CONST. § 12 ("No conviction within the state shall work a forfeiture of estate."); MD. CONST.
art. XXIV ("[N]o man ought to be ... outlawed, or exiled ... but by the judgment of his peers,
or by the Law of the land."); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII ("[N]o subject shall be ... exiled ...
but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15 ("[N]o
conviction shall work ... forfeiture of estate; nor shall any person be transported out of the state
for any offense committed within the state."); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XV ("No subject shall be.
. . exiled . .. but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. . . ."); N.C. CONST. art. I, §
19 ("No person shall be ... outlawed, or exiled ... but by the law of the land."); OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 12 ("No person shall be transported out of the state, for any offense committed within
the same .... ); OKLA. CONST. ar. II, § 29 ("No person shall be transported out of the State for
any offense committed within the State ... without his consent, except by due process of law. .
62
63

."); TENN. CONST. art. 1,

§

8 ("[N]o man shall be ...

outlawed, or exiled ...

but by the

judgment of his peers or the law of the land."); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 20 ("No citizen shall be
outlawed. No person shall be transported out of the State for any offense committed within the
same."); W. VA. CONST. art. IH1,§ 5 ("No person shall be transported out of, or forced to leave
the State for any offence committed within the same. . .
65 Snider, supra note 59, at 466.
6 Borrelli, supra note 63, at 478; see also Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist.
CL App. 1979) (holding conditions of probation valid so long as condition reasonably relates to
rehabilitation); State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 472-73 (Ga. 1974) (holding banishment beyond
the borders of the state unconstitutional but upholding banishment from a seven-county area as a
condition of parole); Cobb v. State, 437 So. 2d 1218, 1220-21 (Miss. 1983) (finding that there
was no violation of constitutional provision when probation was not unreasonable or arbitrary
and did not violate public policy or judicial authority); State v. James, 978 P.2d 415, 416-18
(Or. CL App. 1999) (finding that an exclusion proceeding is not a "criminal proceeding" for
purposes of determining double jeopardy issue); State v. Jacobs, 692 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984) (finding condition of probation to be excessive under state statute without reaching
state constitutional issue); State v. Nienhardt, 537 N.W.2d 123, 125-26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)
(stating, without deciding, that probation conditions may impinge on constitutional rights if such
conditions are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the person's rehabilitation).
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all but one county in the state-even though the two counties to
which prosecutors typically seek to banish offenders are Ware County

("a remote, sparsely populated area in southern central Georgia" 67)
and Echols County (where "[tlhere are no restaurants, hotels or banks,
and only four thousand residents in the county" 68). This form of
banishment has effectively led to banishment from the state, since
the options for housing and work in those counties are minimal .6
Despite the fact that interstate banishment is forbidden by the
Georgia Constitution, the courts in Georgia have found this type of
banishment within the state acceptable.7 Mississippi, Florida,
Wisconsin, and Oregon also allow banishment, but restrict its use
only to situations where it is reasonable and in the interest of the
defendant's rehabilitation . 7'1 Additionally, the State of Washington

permits banishment in accordance with tribal customs.7 2 Aside from
these examples, some state courts have allowed banishment as a
condition of pardon or parole, but nearly every court reviewing
banishment as a condition of probation or suspension of sentence has
found the practice unacceptable.7
C What is Banishment?
Despite the long history of banishment as punishment, there
remains little scholarship on the subject. One explanation, offered by
Garth Snider, is that banishment is most often used as a condition of
probation or parole. Very few defendants challenge the conditions,
and, even when challenges arise, most courts defer to the discretion of
the trial judge.7 As a result of this lack of academic review, there is
little material defining banishment as it is used today, and, in fact,
there seems to be no single definition upon which courts universally
rely. Justice Brewer, dissenting in United States v. Ju Toy, 5 cited the
Black's Law Dictionary definition of banishment: "'punishment
Snider, supra note 59, at 455.
Jason S. Alloy, Note, -lS8-County Banishment" in Georgia: Constitutional
Implications Under the State Constitution and the Federal Right to Travel, 36 GA. L. REV.
1083, 1099 (2002).
69 Seeidatl1103.
70 Edgerton, supra note 54, at 1038-39; see also, e.g., Collett, 208 S.E.2d at 474
(upholding banishment from a seven-county area as a condition of parole); Sanders v. State, 577
S.E.2d 94, 96 (CGa. Ct. App. 2003) (authorizing banishment as a "reasonable condition of
probation or suspension of sentence").
71 Borrelli, supra note 63, at 479.
72 See State v. Roberts, 894 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Wash. Ct App. 1995); Edgerton, supra note
54, at 1038.
73 Snider, supra note 59, at 466.
74Id at 456.
75 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
67

68
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inflicted on criminals, by compelling them to quit a city, place, or
country, for a specified period of time, or for life."-7 6 He went on to
cite another dictionary, defining banishment as " [a] punishment by
forced exile, either for years or for life, inflicted principally upon
political offenders, "transportation" being the word used to express a
similar punishment of ordinary criminals."' 77 Some say that
banishment is a person's exile from a city, country, or state for some
78
length of time, during which the person is prohibited from returning.
It has even been explained simply as being "expelled from . .
community." 79 Others, however, insist that when the word
banishment is used, it is referring to an exile from a large geographic
area, such as a state or country. 8 0 Still others claim that banishment is
more than merely having a restriction placed on where you can go.
For instance, the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Seering8' stated that
"true banishment goes beyond the mere restriction of 'one's freedom
to go or remain where others have the right to be: it often works a
82
destruction on one's social, cultural, and political existence."'
Likewise, other courts have claimed that banishment was a
punishment for "[tlhe most serious offenders . . . after which they
could neither return to their original community, nor, reputation
tarnished, be admitted easily into a new one.",8 3 Needless to say, there
does not seem to be any single definition of banishment that is
utilized by courts today, and, thus, there remains no clear legal
standard for banishment.8
.the

111. RESIDENCY

RESTRICTIONS As BANISHMENT

Although courts have not yet adopted a unified definition of what
it means to be "banished," all the definitions courts have used seem to
have common characteristics. Each provides for: (1) "the expulsion in
fact of a person from a community," (2) banishment "to a
76
77

Id at 269-70 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S L-AW DICTIONARY).
Id at 270 (quoting RAPALJE & L-AwRENCE'S LAW DICTIONARY 109 (Vol. 1)).

Borrelli, supra note 63, at 469.
79 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003).
80 Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (stating that deportation is the
equivalent of banishment); State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 473 (Ga. 1974) (stating that
legislators only intended for the constitutional prohibition on banishment to refer to banishment
from the state); BLACK'S L-AwDICTIONARY 154, 614 (8th ed. 2004).
81 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005).
82 Id. at 667-68 (quoting Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 897
(2d Cir. 1996)).
83 Smith, 538 U.S. at 98 (citing T. BLOMBERG & K. LucKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY: A
HISTORY OF CONTROL 30-31 (2000)).
84 Yung, supra note 3, at 133 (noting that the Supreme Court has still not defined the
parameters of "banishment").
78

20081
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non-institutional setting," and (3) "sever[ing] ties to a community."8
Applying these factors, it seems clear that sex offender residency
restrictions fall into the "banishment" classification. While not all
residency restrictions bar sex offenders from entire neighborhoods,
those with larger safety zones certainly encourage, if not compel, sex
offenders to move out of entire cities. Even restrictions with smaller
safety zones can still be described as expelling a person from a
community, because a particular neighborhood within a city could be
considered a community. In addition, none of the residency
restrictions indicate that the sex offender should end up in a prison,
mental facility, or other institutional setting. The sex offender is free
to reside and, in certain states, work and loiter wherever he likes, so
long as it is not within the specified distance of a protected property.
Finally, all of these laws clearly intend to sever a sex offender's ties
to the community.
The de facto effect of these residency restrictions is that many sex
offenders have been forced to move out of communities to which they
have been tied their entire lives.8 They cannot live or even stay
overnight with their family members 87 and, in some cases, can no
longer work at businesses they themselves own.88 In many cases,
these restrictions have resulted in sex offenders leaving the state
where they have lived their entire lives to move to a state where there
are not such harsh restrictions on them-namely states without any
residency restrictions . 89 Not only do these laws work to sever
community ties, but, at least in part, this is their intended effect.
When the first draft of the Georgia restriction was unveiled, the
Georgia House Majority Leader stated that it was his intent to make it
"'4so onerous, costly, [and] inconvenient (for sex offenders) that they
leave Georgia. I don't care where [they live] as long as it's not

here."' 90

The Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutionality of sex
offender residency restrictions, 9 1 but the highest court to do so, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, has expressly
rejected a claim that these laws serve to exile sex offenders from
communities. In Doe v. Miller,92 the court said,
85
86
87

Id at 134.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 11, at 102-06.

Id.

88 Mann v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007).
89 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 11, at 106.

90 Vicky Eckenrode, Bill to Focus on Sex Crimes, AUGUSTA CHRON., Sept. 29, 2005, at
BI (quoting House Majority Leader Jerry Keen).
91 HUJMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 11, at 127.
92 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
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While banishment of course involves an extreme form of
residency restriction, we ultimately do not accept the analogy
between the traditional means of punishment and the Iowa
statute. Unlike banishment, [Iowa's statute] restricts only
where offenders may reside. It does not "expel" the offenders
from their communities or prohibit them from accessing areas
near schools or child care facilities for employment, to
conduct commercial transactions, or for any purpose other
than establishing a residence. With respect to many offenders,
93
the statute does not even require a change of residence.
The court in Miller used the factors outlined in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez9 4 to determine whether the residency restrictions
were punitive and, therefore, unconstitutional on ex post facto
grounds. 95 In doing so, the court focused on the fact that the residency
restrictions did not resemble a historical and traditional form of
punishment. 96 The law was not restrictive enough for the court to see
the analogy to traditional banishment since it still enabled offenders
to pass through cities and towns and merely restricted their place of

residence.

97

However, the restrictions resemble banishment more than the court
was willing to admit. As the dissent in Miller pointed out, the
restrictions fall into several of the definitions that have been given to
"banishment." 98 The plaintiffs in the case "'.could neither return to
their original community nor, reputation tarnished, be admitted easily
into a new one,"' 9 9 especially when the continuing addition of more
state and municipal residency restrictions is considered. The plaintiffs
and other offenders in states with residency restrictions are prevented
from living in entire towns, and, where they are able to live, there are
very few housing options because the locations are generally rural or
industrial.' 00 Even if they do find an apartment in which to live, there
is no guarantee they will be given a lease as the stigma of being found
Id. at 719.
-~ 372 U.S. 144, 168-9 (1963) (outlining the factors for determining when a law has a
punitive effect for ex post facto purposes including (1) whether the law has been regarded in our
history and traditions as punishment, (2) whether it promotes the traditional aims of punishment,
(3) whether it imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, (4) whether it has a rational
connection to a nonpunitive purpose, and (5) whether it is excessive with respect to that
purpose).
9' Miller, 405 F.3d at 7 18-19.
93

96 Id
97 Id. at 719.
98 Id. at 724 (Melloy, J., concurring and dissenting).
99 Id. (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003)).
100Id.
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on the sex offender registry prompts many landlords to refuse to rent
to them.'0 1
Some might argue that the similarities the restrictions bear to
banishment are not enough. They may well point to the fact that
courts have continually seen banishment as it was traditionally
understood: banning an individual completely from a town, city, or
state, thereby prohibiting them from even stepping foot in the
jurisdiction. To support this argument, they could point not only to
the court's decision in Miller, but also to other decisions, such as City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres.102 In that case, the Supreme Court
held that a municipal ordinance that effectively banned adult movie
theatres from the city did not amount to a complete ban. 103 There, the
ordinance prohibited adult movie establishments from "locating
within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family
dwelling, church, park, or school."'04 In doing so, the law left only
five percent of the land in the city for these theatres to choose from,
and that land was either already occupied or was not commercially
viable for the theatres. 105 The Supreme Court found that there was no
constitutional violation in the ordinance, despite its practical effect of
banning adult movie theatres from the city, because the theatres could
still "fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing
06
with other prospective purchasers and lessees."1
Although residency restrictions do ban sex offenders from living,
working, and loitering in certain areas, the laws do not completely
ban sex offenders from stepping foot within a city or town in the same
way an order of banishment would. However, the larger residency
restrictions clearly prohibit sex offenders from residing in many
smaller towns and cities.1'0 It is also important to recognize that, as
the laws proliferate and become more and more restrictive, the
offenders will be left with fewer and fewer places to live. In addition,
even when the residency restrictions do not completely ban a sex
offender from residing within a municipality, they, along with
municipal restrictions and work or loitering restrictions, leave
offenders with little to no reason to enter entire cities. Aside from the
odd shopping trip or a visit to their family and friends,10 8 there
101Id at 706-07 (majority opinion).
102475 U.S. 41 (1986).
'0'Id. at 46.
14

Id. at 43.
53.
106.
at
54.
07
0

105Id. at

1 See Miller, 405 F.3d at 724 (Melloy, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing the
effect of heightened residency restrictions on sex offenders in Iowa).
108Which, in many cases, would have to be a day visit since most offenders are not
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remains no reason for offenders to even set foot within these cities.
Even if a town does not have a work restriction, the residency
restriction itself acts as a restriction on where they can work, as many
offenders may not be able to afford long commutes to work. The end
result is that, even though offenders are still free to pass through cities
and towns, the likelihood that they would do so is significantly
reduced. As a result, courts should realize that what these state
and municipal legislators are doing is effectively implementing
banishment under a more palatable name. These laws do everything
they can to prevent offenders from living within certain cities and
states, while still being flexible enough to avoid being considered
analogous to traditional banishment. The result is that legislators get
the best of both worlds-they rid their jurisdiction of sex offenders
while implementing a form of punishment that should be considered
punitive and unconstitutional on both state and federal grounds.
Indeed, other courts have found that lesser restrictions may
constitute banishment. In In re Mannino,109 a California court found a
condition of probation requiring a protestor to stay off college
campuses to constitute banishment, which in California was itself an
unlawful form of probation."10 The Washington Court of Appeals
found a probation condition preventing a convicted murderer from
living in the same county as his victim's family for the remainder of
his life to constitute an order of banishment."' In addition, some
courts considering issues of banishment have analogized the
punishment to cases involving lesser geographic restrictions. For
example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found probation
conditions prohibiting a convicted prostitute from entering the French
Quarter in New Orleans," 2 requiring a convicted harasser to stay out
of a town," 3 and barring individuals from bars or scol'14 similar to
a probation condition banishing a convict from the stte" Thus it
seems clear that other courts see restrictions less than banishment

allowed to sleep within a safety zone and must be able to be found at their residence during
nighttime hours. See. e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 11, at 109.
10992 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Cal. Ct. App. 197 1).
Ibi. at 887 (citing People v. Blakeman, 339 P.2d 202, 202-03 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959)).
MState v. Schimelpfenig, 115 P.3d 338, 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
112
Commionwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Mass. 1998) (citing State v. Morgan, 389
So. 2d 364, 366 (La. 1980)).
113Id (citing State v. Nienhardt, 537 N.W.2d 123, 125 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)).
4
11 Id (citing State v. Chariton, 846 P.2d 341 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992)).
115Pike, 701 N.E.2d 95 1.
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from an entire city, county, or state to constitute, or at least be highly
analogous and relevant to, banishment.
Because these residency restrictions are so much like banishment,
one must look at how state courts have addressed banishment to see
how state and federal courts should evaluate residency restrictions. As
previously mentioned, a number of states stipulate in their
constitutions that all banishment is unlawful." 6 Some states, however,
only forbid banishment where there is a lack of due process."1' 7 In
addition, a number of states have attempted to maneuver around
constitutional provisions disallowing banishment by distinguishing
between banishment required as a condition of pardon or parole and
banishment voluntarily agreed to as a condition of probation or early
release, with varying results. 1'8 When state courts have allowed
banishment as a condition of probation or early release, they have
applied certain factors to ensure that the probationer's constitutional
rights were infringed only to the extent that was practical and
necessary. While these factors differ in various states, every state with
banishment case law has set certain requirements that the banishment
must meet. These factors help determine whether or not sex offender
residency restriction provisions would survive the same restrictions
placed on the law of banishment.
A. California
In California, a state that also has sex offender residency
restrictions, the courts are given great latitude in imposing probation
conditions, provided that the conditions are related to rehabilitation
and public safety."19 The California Penal Code allows a court to
impose any
reasonable conditions, as it may
proper to the end that justice may
be made to society for the breach
done to any person resulting from
6

determine are fitting and
be done, that amends may
of the law, for any injury
that breach, and generally

See sources cited supra note 64.
supra note 59, at 465.
118Id at 466; see also Milisaps v. Strauss, 185 S.W.2d 933, 937-38 (Ark. 1945) (holding
that neither Arkansas's constitution nor its statutes confer power on judges to banish inmates
from the state); Bird v. State, 190 A.2d 804, 807 (Md. 1963) (holding that banishment, imposed
as a condition to suspension of a prison sentence, is improper); State ex rel Halverson v.
Young, 154 N~W.2d 699, 703 (Minn. 1967) (holding that probation cannot properly be revoked
based on a condition of banishment); Ray v. McCoy, 321 S.E.2d 90, 92-93 (WI.Va. 1984)
(noting that a West Virginia inmate may knowingly waive her constitutional protection against
banishment).
11
nre Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 197 1).
11

117Snider,
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and specifically for the reformnation and rehabilitationof the
20

probationer-'

However, a condition of probation which "'relates to conduct which
is not in itself criminal, and . .. requires or forbids conduct which is
not reasonably related to future criminality does not serve the
statutory ends of probation and is invalid."",2 1 Since the residency
restrictions regulate conduct which is not itself criminal-living in
proximity to a school-it must be determined in what situations
California courts are permitted to regulate non-criminal conduct.
According to the Supreme Court of California, probation conditions
can regulate conduct that is not itself criminal so long as those
restrictions are "reasonably related to the crime of which the
defendant was convicted or to future criminality."122 Sentencing
courts violate this standard, however, when their determination is
arbitrary or capricious or "'.exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances being considered."", 2 3 Using this standard, the court in
Mannino found a probation condition that barred a protestor
convicted of assault from being present on any school campus
without permission to be overly broad, noting that "banishment itself
is a prohibited term of probation."'124 The court explained that while
his presence on a school campus for the purpose of actively engaging
in a protest could lead to future criminal activity, the condition of
probation was applied to any and all presence on school campuses. ,2
The court held that this restraint on the probationer's personal
liberties was too great under the circumstances and, therefore, struck
26
down the condition.1

If California courts properly applied the above standard to the state
residency restriction, it would likely be struck down. The restriction
obviously regulates non-criminal conduct and, thus, under standards
articulated by the California Supreme Court, can withstand judicial
scrutiny only if it is reasonably related to the crime the probationer
committed or to that probationer's future criminality. The California
sex offender residency restriction, better known as Proposition 83 or
Jessica's Law, would fail under this analysis because the law restricts
120CAL.
121In

PENAL CODE

§ 1203. 1()

(West 2004) (emphasis added).

re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (quoting People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290,

293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)).
122People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545, 548 (Cal. 1975).
123People v. Warner, 574 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Cal. 1978) (quoting People v. Giminez, 534
P.2d 65, 67 (Cal. 1975)).
124 92 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
125Id.
126Id
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all registered sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a school
or park.12 7 However, not every registered sex offender committed a
sexual crime against a child-and it would be difficult to claim that
such a restriction is reasonably related to a person's future criminality
unless their crime had, in fact, been against a child. In addition, the
restriction applies to all registered sex offenders regardless of their
risk of re-offense. Some convicts are forced to register for having
consensual sex with a girlfriend or boyfriend who was under the age
of consent at the time.12 8 These offenders are unlikely to recommit a
sexual crime, since they are well over the age of consent by the time
they get out of prison. However, the residency restriction applies to
them, regardless of the fact that they are considered to be a low risk
for re-offense.

127LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 83: SEX OFFENDERS. SEXUALLY
PREDATORS. PUNISHMENT, RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS AND MONITORING.

VIOLENT

INITIATIVE STATUTE. (Nov. 6, 2006), http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2006/83_11 2006.pdf
(overview of Proposition 83 by the legislature's nonpartisan fiscal and policy analysis
office).
28
1 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-63, 13A-11-200 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. §§
11.41.434, 12.63.010, 12.63.100 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405 (2001); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821 (2001 & Supp. 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-110 (2006 &
Supp. 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-903, 12-12-905 (2003 & Supp. 2007); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 16-22-103, 18-3-402, 18-3-411 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70
(2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-250, 54-251 (2001 & Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.21 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2007); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 11-8-8-5, 11-8-8-7 (West Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-9 (West
2004 & Supp. 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:92(A)(7) (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
15:541, 15:542 (2005 & Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 254 (2006); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11203, 11222 (Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC.
§§ 11-704, 11-701 (LexisNexis 2008); MD. CRIM. LAW §3-304 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp.
2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, §§ 178C, 178D (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 35A (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.722,
28.723, 750.520e (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166, Subd.
lb(a)(1)(iii) (2006 & Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.345 (2003 & Supp. 2008);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.032 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 589.400 (West
1999 & Supp. 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2, 651-B:1, 651-B:2 (LexisNexis
2007); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:7-2 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008): N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2C:14-2,
2C:14-3b (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.7A, 14-208.6, 14-208.7 (2007); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-07, 12.1-32-15 (1997 & Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1123 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 582 (West 2004 & Supp.
2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.1-2, 11-37.1-3 (2002 & Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-3-655 (2003 & Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 22-22-7, 22-24B-2 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-1 (2006 & Supp. 2008);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-506, 40-39-202, 40-39-203 (2006 & Supp. 2007); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.001, 62.002 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2008); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 21.11 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-401, 76-5-401.2 (2003); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (2003 & Supp. 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.096,
9A.44.130 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-2 (LexisNexis 2004 &
Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-9 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 301.45, 948.02 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
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B. Michigan
In Michigan, the trial judge is also given considerable discretion in
imposing probation conditions that may be relevant to the offense
committed and that facilitate or aid the rehabilitation of the
offender.129 But while the sentencing judge is given wide deference in
exercising this discretion, "the exercise of that judgment is not
unfettered: the conditions imposed upon the probationer must bear a
logical relationship to rehabilitation."13 0 In People v. Branson,'3 1 the
Court of Appeals of Michigan upheld a probation condition barring
convicted child abusers from visiting for more than four hours per
32
week or living at a religious camp where they had abused children.'
The court indicated that part of the reason it upheld the restriction,
however, was that other children lived at the religious camp, and the
offenders in the case were not remorseful and took no responsibility
for their actions, instead taking the position that they had done
nothing wrong. 133 Thus, the ruling was focused on the particular
circumstances of the case, the offenders involved, and what was
reasonable to their individual rehabilitation.
Under this standard, the sex offender residency restrictions in
Michigan would also fail. In Michigan, all registered sex offenders
are prohibited from living within 1,000 feet of school property. '3 Not
only does such a provision fail to provide for an individualized
analysis of an offender's risks and rehabilitation needs, but it also
applies to all sex offenders, whether their crimes were against
children or not. Such a restriction cannot possibly be reasonably
related to the rehabilitation of an offender whose crimes were not
against a minor. Even if an offender's crimes were against a minor, he
or she may have very little risk of re-offending, especially if the crime
was something other than sexual assault. In addition, even if the
offender were deemed a high risk for re-offense, studies by Colorado
and Minnesota have shown that residency restrictions have little or no
effect on the chance that a convict will re-offend. 135 In fact, studies
129See,

e.g., People v. Branson, 360 N.w.2d. 614, 616 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).

130Id (citing People v. Higgins, 177 N.W.2d 716 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970)).

1''360 N.w.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
132Id. at 616-17.
133Id. at 616.
134 MICH. Comp. LAWS SERV. §§ 28.733, 28.735 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
35
1 See COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, REPORT ON SAFETY ISSUES RAISED By LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND LOCATION OF SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY 5 (2004),
available at http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsoni/Sex -Offender/SO_-Pdfs/Fu1ISLAFmnaIOI.pdf, MINN.
DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 32, at 11; MINN. DEP'T OF CORRt., RESIDENTIAL PROXIMITY & SEX
OFFENSE RECIDIVISM IN MINNESOTA 2 (2007), available at http://www.corr.state.mn.us/
publications/documnents/04-07SexOffenderReport-Proximity.pdf.
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have shown that restricting housing and work options of released
offenders only inhibits their reintegration into society-which, in
turn, markedly increases the chance of their recidivating. 1 16 Indeed,
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division believes this is
the case. That court recently struck down a municipal residency
restriction, declaring that the law was directly in conflict with the
stated purpose of the State's sex offender registration law-to
"protect society from the risk of re-offense by (convicted sex
offenders) and . . . provide for their rehabilitation and reintegration
37
into the community"-and, therefore, was preempted by state law.'1
Thus, it is possible that these restrictions are, in fact, directly
preventing the rehabilitation of released sex offenders. If a court finds
that to be the case, the residency restrictions stand no chance under
Michigan's case law as it is applied to orders of banishment.
C Washington
While Washington's sex offender residency restriction is far
narrower than those of other states, the law of banishment in the state,
if applied to those restrictions, would likely still require the state to
change its approach. In Washington, the permissibility of an order of
banishment is determined by weighing several factors. According to
the Court of Appeals of Washington, "a sentencing court should
consider the following nonexclusive factors" in determining whether
an order of banishment is legal:
(1) whether the restriction is related to protecting the safety of
the victim or witness of the underlying offense; (2) whether
the restriction is punitive and unrelated to rehabilitation; (3)
whether the restriction is unduly severe and restrictive
because the defendant resides or is employed in the area from
which he is banished; (4) whether the defendant may petition
the court to temporarily lift the restriction if necessary; and
(5) whether less restrictive means are available to satisfy the
38
State's compelling interest.1
In State v. Schimelpfenig,13 9 the court struck down a banishment
order preventing a convicted murderer from living within the same
county as his victim's family.'140 The court explained that the
6

3, at 14 1; COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 135, at 5.
of Galloway, 951 A.2d 221, 225 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
138State v. Schimelpfenig, 115 P.3d 338, 340-41 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
139 115 P.3d 338.
13 Yung, supra note
7
13 G.H. v. Township

140Id

at 33 9.
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restriction had to be evaluated with strict scrutiny, since it infringed
the offender's constitutional right to travel, and found the order did
not pass that test.'14 ' The banishment order was not narrowly tailored
to serve the state interest it was meant to protect because no one ever
evaluated the offender to determine whether or not he was a risk to
the victim's family. In addition, the order prevented the offender, a
man with a mental disability, from living with his family in the only
home he had ever known-a circumstance that the court determined
42
was sure to prevent his rehabilitation.1
The state's sex offender residency restriction would likely be
struck down under this analysis as well. Washington's residency
restriction prohibits Level 11 and III (medium- and high-risk)
offenders convicted of a serious offense from living within 880 feet of
a school.143 Obviously the residency restrictions are related to
public safety, so the first factor weighs in favor of allowing the
residency restrictions. Every other factor, however, weighs in favor of
striking down the residency restrictions. First, in many cases, these
residency restrictions do banish offenders from areas where they
reside. Second, offenders apparently have never been allowed to
petition the court for a temporary lift of the restrictions. Also, we
have already established that the residency restrictions look enough
like banishment, a traditional form of punishment. Therefore, it seems
highly likely that they should be classified as punitive as well. In
addition, we have already seen how these restrictions can hinder,
rather than help, an offender's chance at rehabilitation. And, finally,
the restrictions are indiscriminately applied to all offenders who fit
the statutory requirement, with no individualized determination of
whether the offender is a threat to children or whether depriving them
of housing in these areas would hurt their chances of rehabilitation.
For this reason, under the court's analysis in Schimelpfenig, the
restrictions would likely fail to meet the strict scrutiny test that a court
would apply.
D. Other States
Similarly, other states' court decisions in banishment cases
indicate that their residency restrictions would not survive the same
analysis. In Mississippi, "'courts have uniformly held that
constitutional rights may be abridged by conditions of probation"'.
41

1

Id at 339, 34 1.

4

1 2Id. at 34 1.
143WASH. REV. CODE

(West Supp. 2008).

§ 9.94A.030

(West Supp. 2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.8445
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only where there is "'.some reasonable relationship to the [offender's]
past or future criminality or to the rehabilitative purpose of
probation. ""44 In contradiction of this rule, Mississippi's sex offender
residency restriction prevents all registered sex offenders from living
within 1,500 feet of a school or childcare facility, with no
determination of the offender's risk to recidivate or consideration of
whether such a restriction would help the offender's chances of

rehabilitation.

145

Alabama has applied a rule quite similar to Mississippi's to
probation conditions restricting an offender's right to travel, stating,
"'a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is
not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the
crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future
criminality."' 14 6 Yet Alabama's sex offender residency restriction
applies to all sex offenders, prohibiting them from living or working
within 2,000 feet of a school or childcare facility.147 In addition, other
48
courts have struck down banishment orders under similar rules.1
Despite these rules of banishment and probation conditions, courts
continue to ignore or disregard their relevance in the case of sex
offender residency restrictions.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Because sex offender residency restrictions are proliferating at
both the state and municipal levels, the country must realize that the
laws are not sustainable or practical. One of the primary reasons
banishment from a state has been found unconstitutional is because
144Cobb v. State, 437 So. 2d 1218, 1221 (Miss. 1983) (quoting Brief of Appellant, Cobb,
437 So. 2d 1218 (No. 53924)).
14 MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25(4) (West Supp. 2007).
146Dukes v. State, 423 So. 2d 329, 331 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (quoting Gilliam v. L.A.
Mun. Court. 159 Cal. Rptr. 74, 77 (1979)).
147ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
14B
See, e.g., Edison v. State, 709 P.2d 510, 512 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (finding an order
of banishment from a village as applied to an individual convicted of driving a snow machine
while inebriated to be unlawful because it was not sufficiently related to the offense, was unduly
harsh and restrictive, and was not reasonably related to the offender's rehabilitation); People v.
Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 385-87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (striking down an order of banishment
from the community for a woman convicted of shooting a trespasser on her property because the
order would have forced the offender out of her home of more than twenty-four years and was
more likely to hinder rehabilitation than aid it); State v. Franklin, 604 N.W.2d 79, 83-84 (Minn.
2000) (finding an order of banishment from Minneapolis to be unlawful because the offender
had significant ties to the city and the order was unrelated to the offender's crime-trespassing
in a building on the firinge of the city); Johnson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984) (striking down an order of banishment from the county for an offender convicted of
unauthorized use of an automobile because the order was unrelated to the offender's
rehabilitation and would hinder the offender's rehabilitation by leaving him broke and
unemployed).
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such a punishment is a public policy nightmare. As the Supreme
49
Court of Michigan stated in People v. Baum,'1
To permit one state to dump its convict crimninals into
another would entitle the state believing itself injured thereby
to exercise its police and military power, in the interest of its
own peace, safety, and welfare, to repel such an invasion. It
would tend to incite dissension, provoke retaliation, and
disturb that fuindamental equality of political rights among the
several states which is the basis of the Union itself. Such a
method of punishment is not authorized by statute, and is
impliedly prohibited by public policy.150
Despite this general rule, states are, in effect, dumping their
convicted sex offenders on other jurisdictions through increasingly
harsh residency restrictions, especially when viewed in combination
with employment and loitering restrictions. These acts should, in
themselves, be considered unconstitutional. After all, the Supreme
Court stated in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada... that equal
protection requires each state to furnish their residents with certain
services and opportunities within the state's boundaries. 5 12 As more
and more states and municipalities adopt residency restrictions,
neighboring jurisdictions are jumping on the bandwagon, seeking to
protect themselves from becoming just such a dumping ground. If
such laws continue to proliferate, it is easy to imagine that convicted
sex offenders will soon have nowhere to go. Such a result is clearly
unconstitutional.
Because sex offender residency restrictions are so similar to
banishment, and because courts have imposed certain limitations on
orders of banishment to protect the constitutional rights of offenders
who have had such sentences imposed on them, the rules that apply to
orders of banishment should also be applied to sex offender residency
restrictions. Rules requiring sex offender residency restrictions to be
related to an offender's past and future criminality and rehabilitation
can only serve to help the community and further the interest of
public safety. There is evidence that these residency restrictions
hinder, rather than help, offender rehabilitation by making it more
difficult for them to find housing and employment and, therefore,

149231 N.W. 95 (Mich. 1930).
150Id. at 96.
S305

U.S. 307 (1938).

'2 d at 35 1.
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reintegrate into society upon release from prison. 5 3 In addition, the
fact that most children who have been sexually abused were abused
by people they knew at the time 154 means that, most times, the
restrictions will have no effect on the rate of recidivism unless
offenders are prohibited from all unsupervised contact with children.
It, therefore, becomes necessary to apply the rules of law created for
banishment to the sex offender residency restrictions in order to best
protect society from further sexual crimes.
The best way to do this is to make individualized assessments of
the danger posed by each offender and determine what will be best
for each individual offender's rehabilitation. This means that if an
offender was convicted of statutory rape for having consensual sex
with an underage girlfriend or boyfriend, that situation should be
treated differently than that of someone who has multiple convictions
of child molestation. We cannot indiscriminately apply these
residency restrictions to all sex offenders and expect society to be a
safer place, especially when falling under the purview of these laws
usually results in being cast out from the society the offender has
been a part of-in effect being shamed and exiled from the
community. While some might argue that such individualized
determinations would be too costly and time-consuming for states to
implement, such an argument is misguided.
Some states have already implemented panels of mental health and
corrections professionals to assess an offender's risk prior to release
from prison. 155 All that is needed is for these professionals to make
recommendations as to what would best aid the rehabilitation of a
particular offender. Those recommendations could then be reviewed
by a sentencing court or parole board and implemented following the
offender's release. The use of such a system would limit residency
restrictions to those who truly needed them to avoid recidivating. It
would leave all other offenders with their residences intact and,
hopefully, with improved opportunities to rehabilitate themselves and
reintegrate into society. Such a system would also be extremely cost
effective. The states that already have such risk assessment boards in
place could put them to good use, and those that do not yet have these

153 See Yung, supra note 3, at 141 (discussing how residency restrictions can create
pockets of "sex offender commnunities" which hinder reintegration into society); see also COLO.
DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 135, at 5 (stating that residency restrictions would leave sex
offenders "extremely limited areas" of residency due to large numbers of schools in scattered
locations).
RIGHTS WATCH,
:54HUMAN
5

supra note 11, at 24.

5 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 244.052 (2007).
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boards could rest assured that the cost of implementing this system is
well worth the fundamental liberties it protects.
V. CONCLUSION

While sex offender residency restrictions may give parents the
sense that their children are safe, the reality is that the restrictions
place severe impediments on former offenders which, practically
speaking, amount to a modem-day form of banishment. Some argue
that these sex offenders have given up some of their liberty by
committing such heinous crimes against society. However, most
people fail to realize just how broad and all-encompassing the
residency restrictions are for released offenders. Not only do
offenders become subject to these restrictions for having consensual
sex as teens, but some states require registration for crimes such as
public urination and streaking as well.'516 When these facts are
considered, it becomes obvious that states are indiscriminately
applying these statutes to everyone who falls within an extremely
broad category and are failing to take into account the specific risks
posed by any given offender. States and cities are not just imposing
these restrictive laws against sex offenders, regardless of the risk
posed, but states are also enforcing these statutes without regard to
their effectiveness or side effects.
While it is widely recognized and reported that these laws can
leave offenders homeless, 517 many states have also recognized that the

56

1

See

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,

supra note 11, at 15, 39 (discussing how some states

require registration for non-coercive, non-violent acts having little to do with sexual conduct);
see also ARdZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3821 (2001 & Supp. 2007) (requiring registration if the
individual has more than one previous conviction for public urination, two indecent exposures
to a person under fifteen, or a third indecent exposure to a person over fifteen); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 290, 314(l)-2) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a- 186 (Wesit 2007); COHNN
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-250, 54-251 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008) (requiring registration if the
victim was under eighteen); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-8 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (Supp.
2007) (requiring registration if done in view of a minor); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-4116, 18-

8304, 18-8306 (2004 & Supp. 2008) (requiring registration if convicted of indecent exposure
twice within five years); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.500, 17.520 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.148, 510.150 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, §§

178C, 178G (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 16 (West 2000);
ANN. § 28.722 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
28.723 (West 2004); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 750.167(l)(f) (West 2004) (requiring
registration if convicted of indecent or obscene conduct three times); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
MICH. Comp. LAWS

645:1(1II-I11), 651-B:l, 651-B:2 (LexisNexis 2007) (requiring registration if previously
convicted of indecent exposure); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 1, § 1021 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 582 (West 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430 (2007); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 76-9-702.5, 77-27-21.5 (2003 & Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2601, 5401,
5407 (1998
& Supp. 2007).
157
NiET0 & JUNG, supra note 9, at 18.
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enforcement of these laws does not reduce recidivism rates.158 In fact,
it is well known that residency restrictions-because of their dire
59
consequences-cause some sex offenders to avoid registering.1
These offenders are then lost to law enforcement officials until they
are caught for another crime. In short, not only do these laws severely
restrict the liberties of a population that, on average, has lower
recidivism rates than those of any other offenders,16 0 but they do so
in a way that is highly ineffective at keeping children safe.
Ultimately, this amounts to banishment and should be considered
unconstitutional. If society truly desires such types of restrictions on
former sex offenders, there must be a more individualized method of
determining who should be subject to the laws and who should not.
Without such reform, the country may soon be faced with the very
difficult question of where these offenders have left to go.
KARi

WHITEt

158COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 135, at 4.
159 See id at 24 ("Local residency restrictions may drive some of the estimated 500,000
registered sex offenders in the country underground..
160
N1ET0 & JUNG, supra note 9, at 2.
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